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SUMMARY 
Electrical industry is regarded as the backbone of the ICT branch’s hard-
ware production. The international settlement of this industry is therefore of 
paramount interest for developed economies and emerging market economies 
as well. They all compete for investments in this sector. This study analysis 
the development of Hungarian electrical industry from the early years of 
transition when output performance was at the deepest level and when this 
sector along with the automotive branch became the primary source of eco-
nomic expansion. The sector’s performance is compared with data from 
other CEE countries and with other Hungarian industries in order to illus-
trate the widespread modernization effects of foreign investments in this sec-
tor. The question of activities’ relocation from more developed countries to 
Hungary, and in most recent years from Hungary to less developed regions 
is also dealt with. Relocations are regarded in this paper from the Hungar-
ian viewpoint as necessary and positive developments. Relocated activities 
give room for other, more sophisticated and more income generating activi-
ties. 
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INTRODUCTION* 
The two main manufacturing industries 
to have developed the most complex in-
ternational and global business networks 
are the electrical (NACE DL) and automo-
tive (NACE DM) industries. (Some of the 
former also appears under the latter.) 
They seem to be the most globalized as 
their global spread applies beyond their 
markets or production of finished prod-
ucts or main activities, to a much 
deeper and more extensive international 
division of labour. Their are very com-
plex, consisting of components and sub-
assemblies with a wide range of techno-
logical sophistication. So there is room to 
settle discretionary activities in locations 
that provide the most favourable condi-
tions. This is the main technical condition 
for relatively rapid changes and shifts of 
production location, which in turn is a 
major element of cost competition within 
them. The electrical equipment industry 
makes diverse products, ranging from 
computers, electric motors, cables and 
batteries, semi-conductors, telephones and 
TV sets to electro-medical equipment, 
watches and clocks. 
The expansion of global division of 
labour in the 1990s allowed the transi-
tion economies of Central Europe a sig-
nificant role as well. There is a huge 
literature on the impact of transnational 
                                                 
* The initial version of this paper was composed 
in 2004 for the 5th framework project ‘Changes 
in Industrial Competitiveness as a Factor of Inte-
gration: Identifying Challenges of the Enlarged 
Single European Market’ (Contract No. HPSE–CT–
2002–00148). This is an updated, amended ver-
sion. 
corporations on host economies, which 
will not be recapitulated here. The main 
aim of this paper focuses instead on se-
lected issues, the main aim being to ana-
lyse how foreign investment has contrib-
uted to restructuring of a single branch 
of Hungarian manufacturing and hence 
to restoring that industry’s international 
competitiveness. This issue is placed in a 
dynamic context. An attempt is made to 
follow up further development of invest-
ments, changes in them, upgrading, po-
tential exit, and moves to other locations. 
The analysis draws on statistics and an-
ecdotal evidence. Hungary’s experience in 
developing the industry is compared with 
that of several other transition economies 
and of other manufacturing industries.  
The changes in competitiveness and 
impacts on it can be traced in various 
dimensions. First is the increase in abso-
lute and relative size of the branch. An-
other important issue is the ownership 
pattern, the increasing role of highly ef-
ficient transnational corporations in the 
production. A further important aspect is 
the improvement of the output structure. 
This means a steady increase in the level 
of added value, which also means in-
creasing technological sophistication with 
options for spill-over effects. This also 
means the introduction of new products 
and activities including in some cases 
high level corporate functions like logisti-
cal planning, account management or 
even R&D. This kind of upgrading of 
activities is bound in many cases to the 
relocation of previously pursued activities 
to other low cost locations and their re-
placement by functions moved from 
higher cost countries of the more devel-
oped world.  
We believe these improvements were 
most pronounced in the electrical indus-
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try, which has served as the driving 
force for modernization of the Hungar-
ian economy. But the industry also illus-
trates the rapid changes that may occur 
in the global division of labour due to 
changes in the quantity, quality and 
price of various production factors avail-
able. The electrical equipment industry 
deserves special attention also for its 
strategic importance to the whole econ-
omy, as a major source of innovation 
and base for the ‘new economy’ of the 
21st century (ICT technology).1 
1) STATISTICAL OVERVIEW 
The electrical and optical equipment in-
dustry plays an important role in the 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
economies. It is one of the major em-
ployers, accounting for 5–12 per cent of 
the manufacturing labour force, while its 
4–25 per cent of manufacturing output 
amounts to 2–18 per cent of GDP. The 
industry has increased its size and share 
in most transition economies in the last 
ten years. Table 1 shows that the indus-
try is of paramount importance to Hun-
gary, where it has by far the highest 
shares of production and employment 
found in any of the CEE countries exam-
                                                 
1 Capturing this through statistical analysis is 
rather difficult, as many phenomena embody in-
ter-industrial shifts between activities, especially in 
ICT. Often manufacturing activity is replaced or 
amended by various services, so that a firm’s 
whole turnover may transfer into services. What 
has been in-house service activity is entered 
alongside manufacturing. Further complications 
come with changing corporate competences and 
waves of outsourcing. The attempt here is to 
consider ‘off-shoring’ of activities (in-house 
movement of functions), but the statistics fail to 
differentiate between that and outsourcing, in-
cluding both forms of transfer of corporate 
functions.  
ined. It is also important in the other 
CEE countries, except Bulgaria, where it 
lags behind, although the industry was 
important there also under the pre-
transition COMECON specialization ar-
rangements. Bulgaria also had a sizeable 
electrical industry, but it differs from 
most other transition economies in show-
ing no significant recovery in the indus-
try yet. 
Although the production and employ-
ment shares are also low in Romania 
and Poland, the absolute size of the in-
dustry there is no smaller than in Slove-
nia or Slovakia. Poland and the Czech 
Republic are similarly incorporated in the 
global production network of the indus-
try. Hungary stands out for high pro-
duction and employment shares for the 
industry and because the industry’s em-
ployment shares are much lower than its 
shares in production, so that it has a 
significantly higher level of per capita 
production, especially compared with 
those where the production share is 
lower than the employment share. In 
these countries, the rough measures used 
indicate that productivity in the industry 
is below the average for manufacturing 
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Slovenia). This may point to a different 
intra-industrial structure or to a lower 
effective level of productivity in compa-
rable activities. It will be argued later 
that both factors play a role in the 
higher level of productivity found in 
Hungary’s electrical equipment industry. 
The truly important issue here is to de-
termine the origins of excessive produc-
tivity. Is this a feature of the competitive 
advantage of firms or economies (local 
production factors) or both? Are these 
factors dynamically interlinked? Do local 
factor costs and quality of production 
factors influence capital attraction, 
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producing highly productive production 
facilities by competitive multinationals? 
Does the presence of the multinationals 
improve quality of local production in-
puts? Are there significant spillovers that 
can further improve location advantages? 
In 1989, the shares of the electrical 
equipment industry in manufacturing 
were similar in all CEE countries. Bul-
garia (now lowest) had an 8 per cent 
industry share similar to Hungary’s, 
while the lowest was recorded in Roma-
nia (3 per cent), which cooperated within 
COMECON less closely than other members 
(see Hanzl 2001). The importance of the 
industry increased during the transition 
years in all CEE countries but Bulgaria, 
with the most vigorous development oc-
curring in Hungary, now the only CEE 
country where the industry’s share is 
higher than the EU 15 average. This also 
means that the industry still has fairly 
large growth potential in all other coun-
tries. Table 2 shows the structure of 
manufacturing. The industry increased its 
share in production in all the transition 
economies but Romania’s. The impressive 
increase in the Czech Republic was due 
to new investment (relocation). The al-
ready high share of the electrical equip-
ment industry in Hungary increased fur-
ther between 1999 and 2003, despite the 
loss of several large firms that moved to 
lower-wage locations. New investment in 
Hungary played a role in the expansion, 
but the addition of new functions by in-
cumbent companies was also significant. 
In some cases, this involved relocating 
activities from more developed countries 
(GE, Ericsson, Nokia and others introduc-
ing various services in Hungary). 
During the first period of transforma-
tion (1989 to 1992–5), all CEE countries 
underwent deep transformational reces-
sion: steep decline in production followed 
in some cases by chronic stagnation. The 
electrical equipment industry declined by 
over 20 per cent a year in all CEE 
countries until 1992. In some segments, 
the decline was sharper, e.g. in produc-
tion of semiconductors and computers in 
Hungary, which stopped almost com-
pletely – output fell by 80 per cent. Fur-
thermore, there was no radio-receiver 
production in Hungary between 1992 
and 1995 (Sipos 2003). In general, the 
industry was affected by the recession 
more strongly than was manufacturing 
as a whole, due to the collapse of ear-
lier COMECON specialization patterns and
Table 1
The electrical and optical equipment industry in certain CEE countries 
  
 
 
Production   
million 1999 
Production as 
% of manu-
facturing,  
1999 
Production as 
% of manu-
facturing, 
2003 
Employment 
in thousands, 
1999 
Employment 
as % of 
manufactur-
ing, 1999 
Employment 
as % of 
manufactur-
ing, 2003 
Bulgaria 265.4 2.3 4.3 36.5 6.2 5.1 
Czech Republic 3079.4 6.2 7.9 113.0 10.5 13.2 
Hungary 7361.8 16.3 23.6 116.0 15.6 18.3 
Poland 6250.3 4.3 7.2 173.2 6.6 7.1 
Romania 1029.6 2.8 5.0 74.5 4.4 5.4 
Slovakia. 1142.6 6.2 8.4 54.9 11.0 13.6 
Slovenia 967.0 5.1 8.6 25.2 11.2 12.4 
Source: WIIW 2004. 
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Table 2 
Shares of CEE countries’ manufacturing industries in total manufacturing production 
(1999 and 2003, %) 
 
Bulgaria Czech Rep. Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Hungary 
 
1999 2003 1999 2003 1999 2003 1999 2003 1999 2003 1999 2003 1999 2003 
D: Total manufacturing 100 100  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
DA: Food… 25.2 21.5 17.2 12.8 25.3 22.8 25.1 19.0 13.9 10.8 14.9 12.8 17.0 15.6 
DB: Textiles… 6.7 10.5 4.4 3.5 4.6 3.9 7.2 7.5 4.2 3.2 7.3 6.0 3.6 2.6 
DC: Leather… 1.3 1.2 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.7 1.7 2.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 0.8 0.5 
DD: Wood… 1.5 1.9 2.7 1.9 3.5 3.6 2.5 3.5 3.4 3.7 3.2 2.8 1.2 1.2 
DE: Paper, publishing... 4.2 4.6 4.7 2.5 6.1 6.9 3.1 3.0 6.1 5.5 7.1 7.4 4.3 4.2 
DF: Coke, petrol. 15.0 15.0 2.8 2.9 4.6 4.9 8.0 13.4 6.7 5.3 0.4 0.1 4.9 4.0 
DG: Chemicals… 9.3 8.0 6.7 5.6 6.8 7.3 7.4 7.1 6.0 4.0 10.0 11.0 7.0 7.1 
DH: Rubber, plastics 2.2 2.5 4.3 6.4 4.4 5.8 2.2 3.1 3.3 4.5 4.5 4.7 3.5 3.8 
DI: Non-metal… 5.1 4.9 6.4 5.7 5.4 5.3 4.8 4.0 5.2 4.3 4.8 4.4 2.9 2.9 
DJ: Metal products… 10.3 13.7 15.9 14.0 10.6 10.8 16.3 18.5 17.0 15.9 12.3 13.0 8.1 8.0 
DK: Machinery… 11.5 7.5 8.0 7.4 5.5 5.4 5.5 3.8 7.3 6.7 10.4 11.3 4.7 5.5 
DL: Electrical… 4.3 4.9 7.9 13.9 7.2 7.6 5.0 4.2 8.4 9.2 8.6 9.4 23.6 28.4 
DM: Transport equipment 1.9 1.9 14.3 17.6 10.8 9.4 7.7 7.0 14.0 21.3 9.9 10.4 17.0 15.3 
DN: Other manufacturing… 1.5 2.0 3.9 3.4 4.3 5.6 3.6 3.6 3.2 4.0 5.3 5.0 1.2 1.1 
Source: WIIW 2004. 
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Eastern markets, falls in deliveries for 
military purposes, and in many coun-
tries, rapid liberalization of trade, so 
that less sophisticated domestic (CEE) 
products were swept aside by imports. 
On the supply side, firms could not fol-
low the rapid changes in demand and 
many firms went bankrupt. This came 
sooner in countries where market shocks 
were not absorbed by state protection 
and later where the state tried expensive 
rescue manoeuvres before allowing ailing 
electrical producers to die. A few domes-
tic firms survived through heavy down-
sizing and restructuring.  
Earlier, local producers were replaced 
partly by product imports and partly by 
foreign investors. Then small new domes-
tic producers appeared after 1993, espe-
cially after 1995. Growth rates were ex-
ceptionally high in Hungary, boosted by 
several major greenfield foreign direct 
investments (FDIs), with over 40 per cent 
a year on average between 1993 and 
1999. Growth was also quick in Poland 
and in the Czech Republic at 16 per 
cent a year (Hanzl 2001). Compared 
with total manufacturing, the electrical 
equipment industry proved one of the 
fastest growing (alongside automotive) in 
the three countries. The industry’s 
growth was fastest in Hungary, the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia, fuelled also 
by general economic recovery and high 
growth in other downstream industries 
such as the automotive industry, which 
also received substantial FDI. The growth 
pattern was marked by a rapid rise in 
exports, due partly to demand from re-
gional markets and partly to exports to 
developed countries. Multinational corpo-
rations fitted the old/new production lo-
cations into a new international coopera-
tion network that filled the gap left by 
defunct COMECON cooperation. The in-
vestments were primarily market-seeking, 
but due to the limited size of local mar-
kets, they moved automatically into ex-
porting as well. Efficiency-seeking reloca-
tion, with moves of labour-intensive as-
sembly and production in the interna-
tional network, also started in produc-
tion areas marked by demand for cheap 
unskilled labour. 
Development of the electrical equip-
ment industry lost impetus in Hungary 
after 2000. Hungary as a production 
location fitted into well-established coop-
Table 3
Changes of gross output and export sales in the electrical and optical equipment (DL) 
and transport equipment (DM) industries in Hungary 
(1996–2003, previous year = 100) 
 
D: manufacturing DL: electrical & optical equipment DM: transport equipment 
 
Gross output Exports Gross output Exports Gross output Exports 
1995 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1996 103 119 142 179 126 140 
1997 115 137 179 205 163 168 
1998 116 129 146 159 148 157 
1999 112 123 155 161 120 124 
2000 121 128 154 157 116 117 
2001 104 109 109 115 104 104 
2002 104 106 105 106 101 101 
2003 107 111 117 117 114 114 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Budapest. 
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eration networks by then, and further 
development went more slowly, partly 
because of recession on world markets. 
The period since 2001 has seen slower 
expansion, but big structural changes 
within the industry. A close link between 
production and export changes is shown 
in Table 3. Signs of recovery and a 
more stable growth pattern can be seen 
in the 2003 data. 
During and since the second half of 
the 1990s, the Hungarian economy and 
manufacturing in general have been 
driven primarily by exports. Changes in 
export sales have always exceeded the 
expansion of output, which indicates that 
domestic sales grew much slower than 
exports. The impact of the world eco-
nomic recession that began in 2001 can 
be seen in lower growth rates in exports 
and output, especially in automotive and 
electrical equipment, the two most inter-
nationalized industries, whose growth 
rates exceeded manufacturing average in 
the years of quick expansion, but lagged 
behind it in the recession years. This 
means they depend on world economic 
growth, so that boom and downturn in 
the world economy are transferred to 
them. Nevertheless, another contributor to 
this slowdown after 2000 was the fact 
that the restructuring process was reach-
ing completion. Growth rates in the sec-
ond half of the 2000s can be expected 
to be similar to those of 2003. 
2) INDUSTRIAL 
COMPETITIVENESS 
Wages, productivity and unit labour 
costs in the electrical equipment industry 
have been much lower in CEE economies 
than in almost all EU 15 countries. This 
also indicates, though, that wage levels 
were usually lower than productivity lev-
els, or else unit labour costs would have 
been higher than in the EU 15. More-
over, wage and productivity development 
during the 1990s widened the gap in 
some transition economies, most strongly 
in Hungary, but also in the Czech Re-
public and Slovenia. So unit labour cost 
(ULC) fell continually in the 1990s. This 
had changed by the turn of the millen-
nium, most sharply in Hungary, where 
real wages increased faster than produc-
tivity for two reasons. (i) Rapid im-
provements in productivity were made in 
the 1990s through mass replacement of 
obsolete technology in manufacturing. 
Hungarian productivity levels became 
comparable to EU 15 averages, which 
were even attained in some industries, 
such as electrical equipment. From this 
higher base, it became harder to sustain 
rapid rates of improvement. On the 
other hand, deliberate government policy 
(demand stimulation, vote-catching meas-
ures) caused average real wages to start 
to rise in 2000, most strongly in the 
state administration, but with knock-on 
effects on manufacturing wages.  
According to calculations by Hanzl 
(2001), CEE nominal wage rates per em-
ployee in the electrical equipment indus-
try were about 10 per cent of those in 
Austria, lower still in the Balkan coun-
tries (4 per cent), and highest among 
CEE countries in Slovenia (27 per cent). 
Productivity levels ranged from Bulgaria’s 
13 per cent to 45 per cent in Poland, 
but in Hungary surpassed Austria’s at 
110 per cent in 1999. So Hungary had 
the lowest unit labour costs of any CEE 
country – under 10 per cent of the Aus-
trian level (Hanzl 2001, p. 10). Yet in 
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1991–2, it had still been over 50 per 
cent.   
This highly advantageous situation for 
investors began to change in 2000 as 
real wages rose. The long period when 
wage increases lagged behind productiv-
ity rises must have changed the distribu-
tion of added value between labour and 
capital somewhat. The increase in real 
wages was only marginal in Hungary in 
the 1990s, while GDP was starting to 
grow. Wage rises were also meagre 
compared with other transition economies 
(except the Balkan countries). But the 
miraculous decrease in unit labour costs 
was mainly achieved by introducing 
highly efficient, up-to-date technologies, 
and only to a lesser extent through bet-
ter labour performance. Productivity con-
tinually increased by 20–30 per cent a 
year over the 1993–2000 period in the 
electrical equipment industry, while earn-
ings rose at a slower rate of 10–15 per 
cent. This changed after 2000, as Table 
4 shows.  Figures for 1999 and 2000 
still show very high productivity in-
creases, but there is a drop in 2001 and 
2002. 
For a more careful analysis, however, 
it has to be noted that per capita output 
is a sensitive measure. Output potential 
is broadly influenced by the capabilities 
of production factors, but actual usage 
of these depends on sales potentials. The 
dramatic drop in the productivity figures 
of the computer industry (NACE 30) is a 
straight consequence of falling sales 
revenues, due to world economic reces-
sion and partly to the sale, shutdown 
and move to China of perhaps the most 
productive plant in the industry: IBM 
Storage Products Inc. Thus the situation 
is not that bad: the productivity indices 
were depressed temporarily by low sales 
levels. 
Another way besides cost analysis to 
express the competitiveness of industries 
is through sales and especially trade per-
formance. Industries able to expand on 
sales markets can be regarded as com-
Table 4
 Competitiveness and foreign ownership. Changes in some indicators for Hungary’s electrical 
industry 1998–2003, % change, previous year = 100, except in foreign ownership 
(% share of foreign owners in subscribed capital) 
 
  30 31 32 33 DL DM D 
Output/employee 83.4 107.0 150.6 109.4 134.8 125.6 111.0 
Average monthly earnings 96.5 120.0 123.5 111.1 118.4 116.9 115.9 
 
1990 
 Foreign ownership 39.6 85.3 85.1 22.4 71.4 74.4 60.5 
Output/employee 127.3 136.8 133.6 108.7 129.0 114.2 118.9 
Average monthly earnings 111.9 115.2 117.7 116.3 115.9 117.0 116.4 
 
2000 
 Foreign ownership 30.9 76.0 90.8 31.1 73.0 71.9 61.3 
Output/employee 66.8 162.9 91.5 105.5 107.3 96.8 104.3 
Average monthly earnings 111.0 111.3 116.7 114.5 113.0 116.0 114.8 
 
2001 
Foreign ownership 31.7 86.8 93.8 29.9 80.6 84.5 64.4 
Output/employee 80.7 108.5 126.0 86.0 107.5 97.4 104.3 
Average monthly earnings 122.0 112.0 112.7 105.1 112.2 112.6 112.8 
 
2002 
 Foreign ownership 30.3 82.3 92.5 20.9 76.3 82.0 63.5 
Output/employee 124.8 79.9 147.0 119.8 120.4 108.6 110.6 
Average monthly earnings 102.0 107.8 109.2 115.1 108.6 105.3 109.4 
 
2003 
 Foreign ownership 29.2 83.4 95.3 31.6 79.5 82.2 67.5 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Budapest.
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petitive: increase in market share results 
from a high level of competitiveness. 
Trade with the EU stands out in this re-
spect. In the 1990s, the former role of 
COMECON was taken over by the EU. The 
EU 15 became the main export market 
for the electrical equipment industry as 
well. In the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Hungary, the EU 15 share in industrial 
exports was around 80 per cent in the 
early 2000s. 
As with production and employment, 
Hungary has the highest share of electri-
cal equipment in total exports (about 30 
per cent). This share was proportionally 
lower in other CEE countries in 2003: 21 
per cent in the Czech Republic, 11 per 
cent in Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, 7 
per cent in Romania, and 4 per cent in 
Bulgaria. Export shares were higher for 
this industry for overall production, 
which reflects an above-average export 
intensity in the electrical equipment in-
dustry (see Tables 5 and 6). The share 
of the industry in total exports in the 
CEE countries grew steadily. Hungary 
achieved the largest export increase, 460 
per cent, between 1995 and 1999, as 
several greenfield investments in the in-
dustry came into operation. When the 
flow of such extensive investment dried 
up, the increases in export sales re-
turned to ‘normal’, much lower levels. 
But the industry had even higher 
share of total imports, due to the import 
needs of foreign investors (e.g. outward 
processing) and increased demand for 
consumer electronics and IT imports. The 
exception was Hungary, where the share 
was lower in imports than exports – this 
can be explained several ways, but all to 
do with relatively high development of 
the electrical equipment industry. For ex-
ample, equally high export and import 
shares indicate a low level of local value 
added in exports. Another cause may be 
a higher share of local consumption (e.g. 
in consumer electronics) delivered from 
local factories, which pushes imports 
lower. Indeed, there is ample evidence of 
upgrading of production and export 
structure in the Hungarian electrical 
equipment industry. At first sight, a pro-
found difference in finer trade structure 
appeared, when compared with other 
transition economies. According to 1999 
calculations by Hanzl (2001), all other 
countries’ exports were heavily concen-
trated on electrical machinery and appa-
ratus n.e.c. (NACE 31, 50–60 per cent), 
followed far behind by radio, TV and 
communication equipment (NACE 32, 10–
37 per cent of exports). Exports of of-
fice machinery (NACE 30) and medical 
precision and optical instruments (NACE 
33) were far behind. The 1999 structure 
in Hungary was markedly different: ra-
dio, TV and communication equipment in 
first place (big investments in cellular 
telephony and consumer electronics), and 
office machinery (big investments by 
leading world firms in electronics, com-
puter technology and informatics) a close 
second. 
Comparing 1999 with 2003, big shifts 
appear in the Czech Republic, where 
hitherto low-level specialization in com-
puter and office machinery greatly in-
creased, making the intra-industrial 
structure more balanced. The drop in 
Hungary’s computer industry came from 
relocation of assembly by IBM and Flex-
tronics in 2002. The structure in the 
other 4 countries remained fairly stable 
and concentrated (Tables 5 and 6). 
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Table 5 
Detailed export structure of electrical industry in 1999, % of total DL exports 
 
 Czech  
Republic Poland Slovakia Slovenia Hungary
30 Office machinery, computers 7.2 1.8 17.2 2.1 32.4 
31. Electrical machinery 64.0 55.4 66.5 59.8 30.1 
311 Electric motors, generators, transformers 14.4 10.0 18.4 26.2 5.5 
312 Electrical distribution, control apparatus 18.3 8.3 3.3 9.4 5.7 
313 Insulated wire, cable 8.7 8.2 6.2 2.8 3.0 
314 Accumulators, primary cells, primary batteries 4.9 3.9 0.0 2.0 0.0 
315 Lighting equipment, electric lamps 2.2 10.2 3.0 3.9 5.6 
316 Electrical equipment n.e.c. 15.5 14.7 35.5 15.6 10.3 
32 Radio TV telecommunications 19.9 37.3 13.4 12.0 33.6 
321 Electronic valves, tubes, components 12.4 9.1 5.4 7.4 5.7 
322 TV, radio transmitters, line telephony, telegraphy 2.4 2.5 1.6 1.0 1.1 
323 TV, radio receivers, sound, video recording, etc. 5.1 25.7 6.3 3.5 26.7 
33 Instruments, watches 8.9 5.5 3.0 26.0 3.9 
331 Medical, surgical equipment, etc. 1.7 2.1 1.2 2.8 0.9 
332 Measuring, testing, etc. equipment 4.6 2.8 1.6 16.9 2.2 
334 Optical, photographic equipment 2.3 0.2 0.2 5.3 0.7 
335 Watches, clocks 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.0 
DL Electrical & optical equipment 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
DL in € million 2634 2167 752 591 5792 
Source: EU New Kronos. 
 
Table 6 
Detailed export structure of electrical industry in 2003, % of total DL exports 
 
 Czech   Republic Poland Slovakia Slovenia Hungary
30 Office machinery, computers 29.3 2.0 12.8 2.7 24.6 
31. Electrical machinery 40.3 53.5 57.0 56.7 30.4 
311 Electric motors, generators, transformers 8.0 8.0 17.8 21.7 5.2 
312 Electrical distribution, control apparatus 11.8 10.8 5.4 9.0 7.8 
313 Insulated wire, cable 4.7 7.5 4.0 2.6 9.2 
314 Accumulators, primary cells, primary batteries 3.1 3.0 0.1 3.7 0.2 
315 Lighting equipment, electric lamps 1.5 7.7 4.7 3.4 5.5 
316 Electrical equipment n.e.c. 11.2 16.5 25.0 16.3 2.5 
32 Radio TV telecommunications 23.1 36.4 23.4 20.5 38.2 
321 Electronic valves, tubes, components 9.0 8.3 10.3 7.2 8.6 
322 TV, radio transmitters, line telephony, telegraphy 7.5 2.4 0.9 9.9 2.8 
323 TV, radio receivers, sound, video recording, etc. 6.6 25.7 12.2 3.4 26.8 
33 Instruments, watches 7.3 8.1 6.8 20.1 6.9 
331 Medical, surgical equipment, etc. 1.5 2.9 2.9 2.8 1.4 
332 Measuring, testing, etc. equipment 4.0 4.7 3.3 13.0 4.3 
334 Optical, photographic equipment 1.7 0.3 0.5 4.0 1.2 
335 Watches, clocks 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0 
DL in € million 43027 47526 19305 11285 38096 
D in € million 43027 47526 19305 11285 38096 
DL share in total D, % 21.7 11.5 11.0 11.9 28.5 
Source: EU New Kronos. 
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Hungary’s different production and 
export structure may provide some ex-
planation for the industries’ outstanding 
development pattern. Éltető (1999) and 
others also noted that in Hungary’s 
trade structure, so-called high-technology 
products had a larger share than in 
other CEE countries and that this share 
was still increasing. Table 7 shows devel-
opments in the export structure of Hun-
garian manufacturing. Even conservative 
observers would agree there was sub-
stantial up-grading in the structure, es-
pecially in the second half of the 1990s. 
Marginalization of resource-based ex-
ports is an especially welcome develop-
ment, as Hungary has always been poor 
in natural resources and had to import 
them to run facilities in these industries, 
whose value added was therefore low. 
But the very high share of high-tech 
products covers activities of a mixed na-
ture. There are simple assemblies, as in 
some electronics products, but also ac-
tivities with fairly high local content and 
local value added. 
But do these results really indicate 
better performance? Moves by two fac-
tories from Hungary to China much al-
tered the industry’s production and ex-
port structure. This shows 
firm-specific features and 
advantages may have been 
important in these Hungar-
ian operations. Local com-
petitive advantages seem to 
have played little role, as 
large-scale investments were 
moved almost overnight 
from one location to an-
other. Yet despite the loss 
of some 5 per cent of total 
Hungarian exports by these 
moves, the trade deficit did 
not deteriorate; in these 
cases, imports were also 
very high: the activity was 
rather assembly with very 
low local value added. So 
‘screwdriver’ industries 
should be distinguished 
from those with longer-
term prospects in a coun-
try, which produce more 
local value added and in-
tend to increase the level 
of this. 
One measuring method, 
developed by the WIIW, is 
Table 7 
High, medium and low-technology products in Hungary’s ex-
ports to the EU 
 
 1985 1990 1995 2000
 Market share 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.9 
1. Primary products 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 
2. Resource based manufactures 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 
3. Manufactures not based on res. 0.2 0.3 0.5 1.1 
Low technology 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.8 
Medium technology 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.3 
High technology 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.1 
4. Others 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Export structure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1. Primary products 26.9 20.8 10.5 4.5 
2. Resource based manufactures 32.9 27.1 18.4 9.8 
3. Manufactures not based on res. 39.2 50.5 70.0 85.1 
Low technology 22.6 27.2 25.9 14.9 
Medium technology 12.7 18.2 32.6 44.9 
High technology 3.9 5.1 11.6 25.2 
4. Others 1.0 1.6 1.0 0.6 
Principal exports 2.8 4.9 23.9 50.2 
Internal combustion piston engines 0.1 0.1 7.2 12.4 
Automatic data-processing machines 0.1 0.0 1.0 10.1 
Passenger motor cars 0.0 0.1 1.8 6.6 
Sound equipment 0.0 0.0 1.1 3.4 
Telecommunications equipment 0.2 0.9 2.4 3.4 
Equipment for electricity distribution 0.1 1.1 3.7 3.3 
Parts, accessories of motor vehicles 0.3 0.5 2.0 3.1 
Parts of electrical equipments 0.1 0.2 0.9 2.8 
Electrical machinery  1.7 1.5 3.1 2.7 
Television receivers 0.1 0.5 0.9 2.4 
Source: UNCTAD 2002 
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based on differences of unit export val-
ues. Unit value of total EU imports is 
compared with unit value of imports 
from specific countries, the differences 
being expressed in a ‘price/quality gap 
indicator’. A low unit price level indi-
cates less sophistication and/or inferior 
quality in exports of a given product 
group. Table 8 gives figures for 1995–9. 
 
For the five-year average and for 
1999, the indicator was negative for EU 
exports of electrical equipment exports 
from all CEE countries but Hungary. The 
largest trade gaps appeared in the two 
Balkan countries and the Czech Republic, 
while Slovakia, Slovenia and Poland were 
near equilibrium, though still negative. 
Hungary showed a remarkable +0.30 in 
1999, i.e. prices on average 30 per cent 
higher than the average of total EU im-
ports. The indicator improved in all 
countries between 1995 and 1999 (Hanzl 
2001). Table 8 shows the price/quality 
gap indicator across segments of the in-
dustry, with best values in ‘radio, TV 
and telecommunication equipment and 
apparatus’ (32). Hanzl (2001) adds light-
ing equipment and lamps (315), watches 
and clocks (335). 
Scores for the price/quality gap indi-
cator support the same picture of supe-
rior performance by Hungary’s electrical 
equipment industry. But an exceptionally 
high figure for computers (+1.061) sug-
gests that the high average hides wide 
intra-industry differences. A fairly low (-
0.41) value for instruments, for example, 
is around average for the countries 
studied. In a more detailed list in Hanzl 
(2001, p. 23), no less than 9 negative 
scores out of 15 appear even in Hun-
gary’s case. A few industries did very 
well and their outstanding performance 
pushed averages very high, presumably 
because their weight in exports was high 
too. Especially strong in Hungary were 
lighting equipment (+0.53), a traditionally 
strong Hungarian area now run by Gen-
eral Electric, and electrical equipment 
n.e.c. (0.45), another stronghold with 
Table 8
Price/quality gap indicator for CEE exports 
to the EU of electrical and optical equipment (DL) 
 
 Bulgaria Czech Republic Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Hungary
1999        
30 Office machinery, computers -0.303 -0.429 -0.417 -0.346 -0.158 0.162 1.061 
31. Electrical machinery -0.312 -0.234 -0.080 -0.281 -0.195 -0.134 0.160 
32 Radio TV telecommunications -0.017 0.064 -0.057 0.383 0.139 -0.139 0.046 
33 Instruments, watches -0.539 -0.438 -0.474 -0.563 -0.345 -0.181 -0.410 
DL Electrical & optical equipment        
1995 -0.402 -0.239 -0.252 -0.433 -0.282 -0.237 -0.087 
1996 -0.477 -0.293 -0.288 -0.460 -0.374 -0.238 -0.066 
1997 -0.432 -0.228 -0.224 -0.393 -0.313 -0.269 0.012 
1998 -0.375 -0.152 -0.044 -0.207 -0.189 -0.231 0.061 
1999 -0.304 -0.219 -0.103 -0.262 -0.157 -0.148 0.318 
Average 1995–9 -0.398 -0.226 -0.182 -0.351 -0.263 -0.225 0.048 
Change in % 1995–9 4.8 2.3 6.6 9.1 5.8 2.3 8.6 
Source: WIIW database in Hanzl 2001. 
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much foreign investment (Siemens, ABB, 
Bosch and others). TV and radio receiv-
ers, sound video recorders (+0.42) were 
also strong industry with high export 
shares, dominated by Phillips, Sony, TDK 
and other well-known brands. Office 
machines and computers (+0.23) also 
had high shares in exports and were 
dominated by a few multinationals such 
as IBM and Flextronics. Electric motors, 
generators and transformers scored posi-
tively (+0.02) but export share was 
marginal. Industries with strong foreign 
penetration in local production achieved 
better price/quality gap values. Data for 
Hungary’s largest exporters appear in 
Table 9. 
 
Another often-used way of analysing 
trade performance is Bela Balassa’s RCA 
(revealed comparative advantage) indica-
tor, a trade specialization index showing 
the industries where one country or an-
other has above-average specialization in 
trade. RCA says little about the ‘quality’ 
of specialization: evaluation is left to the 
subjective opinion of the observer. Nor 
can it shed light on the real content of 
the trade flows, but it becomes possible 
with WIIW’s price/quality gap indicator 
to assess whether a country’s strong spe-
cialization in, say, high-tech product 
groups really covers high-tech activities 
or at least substantial local contributions 
to high-tech products. A snapshot com-
parison of the CEE countries in 1999 
appears in Table 10. Hungarian speciali-
zation indices are unsurprising. As ex-
pected the same branches showed strong 
specialization which also provided positive 
price/quality gap values, and weighted 
the most in the export structure of 
Hungarian electrical equipment industry 
(Tables 5, 6 and 8).  
Similarly, the RCA index was negative 
in all other countries, which reflects their 
negative industrial 
trade balances. 
And a comparison 
with RCA data for 
all manufacturing 
indicates a com-
parative disadvan-
tage for the indus-
try in all other 
CEE countries. The 
disadvantage or 
‘de-specialization’ 
was greatest in the 
Balkan countries 
and smallest in 
Slovenia. But here 
again, the interpre-
tation of the figures is questionable. Very 
high negative values indicate virtually no 
export activity or even local production 
in the given product group. In interna-
tionally highly competitive and complex 
industries like electrical equipment, to-
day’s firms can no longer thrive on the 
domestic market alone. On the other 
hand, most CEE countries are small or 
at most medium-sized economies (Poland 
Table 9
Exports from Hungary by the 12 leading foreign affiliates, 2000 
 
Name Country of origin Industry 
Value (USD 
million) 
% of ex-
ports 
Audi Hungaria Motor Germany Automotive 3187 11.2 
IBM Storage Products United States Electronics 2240 7.8 
Philips Magyarország Netherlands Electronics 2027 7.1 
GE Hungary United States Electronics 639 2.2 
Opel Magyarország United States Automotive 628 2.2 
Flextronics International Singapore Electronics 430 1.5 
Alcoa Köfém United States Aluminium 314 1.1 
Magyar Suzuki Japan Automotive 300 1.1 
NABI United States Automotive 249 0.9 
Samsung Electronics Korea Electronics 241 0.8 
Electrolux Lehel Sweden Machinery 212 0.7 
Visteon Hungary United States Electronics 187 0.7 
Source: UNCTAD 2002. 
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Table 10 
The RCA structure of the electrical and optical equipment industry, 1999 
 
 Bulgaria Czech Republic Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Hungary 
30 Office machinery, computers -0.95 -0.50 -0.92 -0.44 -0.11 -0.85 0.23 
31. Electrical machinery -0.33 0.04 -0.10 -0.07 0.06 0.02 0.14 
311 Electric motors, generators, transformers 0.14 0.05 -0.13 0.20 0.12 0.40 0.02 
312 Electrical distribution, control apparatus -0.52 -0.11 -0.45 -0.70 -0.67 -0.29 -0.12 
313 Insulated wire, cable -0.45 0.07 -0.18 -0.59 -0.25 -0.54 -0.14 
314 Accumulators, primary cells, primary batteries -0.86 0.33 0.08 -0.57 -0.98 0.03 -0.83 
315 Lighting equipment, electric lamps 0.08 -0.17 0.22 0.23 0.24 -0.19 0.53 
316 Electrical equipment n.e.c. -0.61 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.41 0.13 0.45 
32 Radio TV telecommunications -0.70 -0.35 -0.32 -0.79 0.42 -0.53 0.09 
321 Electronic valves, tubes, components -0.13 -0.17 -0.27 -0.87 -0.32 -0.12 -0.35 
322 TV, radio transmitters, line telephony, telegraphy -0.93 -0.73 -0.88 -0.72 -0.80 -0.91 -0.63 
323 TV, radio receivers, sound, video recording, etc. -0.43 -0.26 0.23 -0.89 -0.12 -0.41 0.42 
33 Instruments, watches -0.54 -0.38 -0.67 -0.77 -0.74 -0.05 -0.31 
331 Medical, surgical equipment, etc. -0.93 -0.52 -0.63 -0.88 -0.47 -0.53 -0.33 
332 Measuring, testing, etc. equipment -0.50 -0.44 -0.69 -0.76 -0.81 0.07 -0.32 
334 Optical, photographic equipment 0.01 0.04 -0.87 -0.37 -0.62 0.24 -0.20 
335 Watches, clocks 0.24 -0.18 -0.31 -0.74 -0.98 -0.24 -0.71 
DL Electrical and optical equipment -0.60 -0.17 -0.35 -0.42 -0.14 -0.20 0.12 
Source: Hanzl (2001) 
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and perhaps), with limited production 
input capacities. So there has to be some 
kind of specialization. It is virtually im-
possible to produce everything and have 
high specialization indexes in all product 
groups. 
There is a subjective element in how 
to evaluate some specialization pattern or 
other. The OECD guidelines on technol-
ogy intensity (Table 7) may be an impor-
tant aspect. High-tech branches may pro-
vide important growth and modernization 
impulses for other industries. But this is 
obviously not the case if the local value 
added is small and the local activity less 
than high tech, even if the figures pro-
ject positive pictures in every respect. 
What if an industry consists solely of 
‘screwdriver’ factories? Do these also 
give the expected spillover effects? They 
may under some conditions and in the 
longer run. The ‘screwdriver’ industries 
of South-East Asian countries gave neces-
sary stimuli, and Indian software ven-
tures also show some upgrading of ac-
tivities from their original data process-
ing. Here the quality of the local busi-
ness environment and economic policies 
(industrial policy) are crucial.  
3) FOREIGN OWNERSHIP, 
RELOCATION AND            
COMPETITIVENESS 
The main purpose of this paper has 
been to analyse relationships of competi-
tiveness and FDI through production re-
location, in one particular segment of 
manufacturing: the electrical equipment 
industry. The intention here is not to 
draw general conclusions on the subject, 
but concentrate on that single industry. 
It has been shown in the previous sec-
tion that foreign-owned companies have 
played a dominant role in shaping the 
structure of Hungarian manufacturing 
and exports. Two main new issues now 
emerge. The first is new experience with 
dynamics of FDI inflows and outflows, 
and the second the question of spillover 
effects. This section covers rather briefly 
these two issues in the context of electri-
cal equipment industry. 
The data in earlier tables has already 
shown that there were fundamental 
changes in the structure of the manufac-
turing industry and exports, due largely 
to the electrical equipment (DL) and 
automotive (DM) industries. These two 
also accounted for most of the foreign 
investment. The firms settling in Hungary 
included not only primary producers, 
but first and even second-tier suppliers. 
A good example of a big first-tier sup-
plier is Flextronics, which supplies several 
electrical and automotive firms.  
FDI flows up to 2000 were almost 
exclusively inward investment, mainly in 
privatization purchases and greenfield 
investments. There were relatively few 
privatization transactions in the electrical 
equipment industry, partly because the 
industry was not so big as it is today, 
and partly because many of the state-
owned firms failed in 1993–5. The big-
gest deal was General Electric’s purchase 
of its competitor Tungsram. Siemens also 
made important privatization investments 
(cable production, telecommunications 
equipment production) and added 
greenfield establishments. ABB purchased 
the electrical apparatus branch of Hun-
garian Ganz and Samsung the Hungar-
ian TV maker Orion. But the biggest in-
vestments were in greenfield plant, and 
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most privatization purchases were later 
complemented by greenfield investments, 
sometimes entailing the relocation of pro-
duction from other countries. The largest 
factories established were IBM Storage 
Products and Flextronics, other major 
investments being made by Ericsson and 
Nokia. Almost the entire computer 
industry was set up as greenfield 
ventures, as were large parts of the 
consumer electronics and telecommunica-
tions equipment segments. Observers 
agree that the main incentives to invest 
were proximity to Western European 
markets, reliable, motivated and relatively 
cheap labour, fiscal incentives, and pri-
vatization opportunities. These also ap-
pear to have played a role in investment 
in electrical equipment production.  
It is not easy to estimate the extent of 
relocation in this period. Most privatiza-
tion deals and many greenfield ventures 
resulted in a sizeable increase in total 
corporate production and sales. The 
opening-up of new markets in the CEE 
countries called for an increase in ca-
pacity, especially for consumer markets. 
But with the electrical equipment indus-
try, the huge increase in consumer elec-
tronics sales were not the only factor 
behind the rapid rises in production, as 
there was a high replacement ratio of 
outdated production machinery, an un-
precedented boom in infrastructural de-
velopment, investment in environmental 
protection etc. Much of this new demand 
could not have been met from existing 
in production facilities in developed 
countries, only through heavy expansion 
of capacity in the CEE countries them-
selves. So much of the new investment in 
the early period was new capacity that 
could have gone to developed countries, 
but CEE countries were preferred. Facto-
ries that supply global markets also 
serve developed countries, and this is the 
case with many investments in the elec-
trical industry. Relocation of activities 
was exceptional in this period.  
Relocations started become more im-
portant after about 1998–2000. This was 
quite natural: efficiency-seeking invest-
ments based on more sophisticated cost 
calculations gained momentum after an 
initial introductory period marked by 
experience gathering, privatization bar-
gains, and jostling for position on the 
new markets. This also meant that exist-
ing facilities in CEE countries came to be 
evaluated and compared like other ele-
ments in the global cooperation network, 
so that they increasingly became regular 
players in the global corporations’ in-
house sourcing competition, where they 
won in many cases, so expanding ‘at the 
cost’ of other locations within the group. 
New investment and the movement of 
various activities among foreign affiliates 
is regarded as relocation. The rationale 
behind the whole relocation issue to in-
crease efficiency by tapping new re-
sources or lowering production costs. 
The main beneficiary is obviously the 
corporation, which can expand its mar-
kets or enhance its efficiency. But it can 
also benefit host economies, especially if 
the low costs are not secured through 
excessive state support costing more than 
the potential benefits of the investment. 
More indirectly, donor countries may 
benefit from transfers of activities due to 
increased overall turnover (a kind of 
spillover effect of overall expansion), 
profit transfers and increased efficiency.   
A good illustration of the changes in 
conditions and corporate strategies at the 
turn of the millennium is the case of 
Flextronics. By 2000, the company had 
invested some USD 800 million in Hun-
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gary: 80 per cent of its cumulative re-
gional investment. Flextronics has desig-
nated Hungary as one of its potential 
centres of excellence for electronics de-
velopment. The strategy is based on the 
assumption that a balance between costs 
and capabilities can be maintained only 
if the location is gradually upgraded by 
investing more into capabilities,. Simple 
handling activity should be replaced or 
supplemented by design work and prod-
uct development. Another option is to 
abandon the location when growing local 
costs (especially wages) mean that simple 
handling activities become unprofitable 
there. Recent developments, for example 
the moving of Flextronics’ X-Box produc-
tion and IBM’s hard-disk drive assembly 
to China highlight the need to upgrade 
from increasingly uncompetitive assembly 
to activities with higher value added. It 
was seen that development of skills and 
EU membership would continue to push 
up wages in Hungary, and so Flextron-
ics, after 2000, considered subcontract-
ing sub-assembly work to lower-wage 
countries not previously selected for in-
vestment. In 2001, the firm opened a 
facility at Berekhovo (Beregszász) in the 
Ukraine, close to the Hungarian border, 
to assemble circuit boards for its Nyíre-
gyháza facility. 
Flextronics and IBM were not the only 
foreign-owned companies to disinvest in 
Hungary. The many new investments and 
capacity expansions in the country after 
2000 coincided with cutbacks in simpler, 
now unprofitable activities, producing a 
qualitative change in the activity struc-
ture of multinationals in Hungary. 
UNCTAD (2003) lists the main changes in 
the stock of foreign-owned ventures in 
the period 2002–mid-2003; these are 
epitomized in Table 11. Assuming the 
data are broadly representative of the 
types of direct-investment movement in 
Hungary, some conclusions can be 
drawn. (i) Despite some important cases 
of relocation from Hungary to China or 
Ukraine, the scale of expansion and 
foundation of ventures in Hungary re-
mained far greater, in terms of numbers 
of cases and potential impact on em-
ployment. (ii) Most relocations from 
Hungary involved labour-intensive activi-
ties in light industry or ‘screwdriver’ 
activity in electronics. (iii) While existing 
activities were expanded, new activities 
were taken up. There were even some 
parallel movements within the same firm: 
one activity giving way to another, usu-
ally more sophisticated one with higher 
added value. (iv) The new activities in-
volved both expanding production and 
introducing new corporate functions, 
such as R and D. (v) The two seminal, 
fastest growing areas of capital move-
ment were the automotive and electrical 
equipment industries. 
These two industries also appear to be 
leaders in the development of local roots. 
Maybe this is only because they are the 
most dynamic industries worldwide and 
also very strong in Hungary. But empiri-
cal evidence suggests that automotive 
firms are strong in establishing of local 
supplier ties and electrical equipment 
makers rely actively on local engineering 
and research staff.  Sass and Szanyi 
(2004) provided detailed analysis of the 
determinants of the likelihood and nature 
of multinationals’ local-supplier ties, con-
cluding that overall local supplies are 
marginal. 
There are very few exceptions, where 
special circumstances induced multina-
tionals to be active in promoting linkage 
creation or transferred preparatory 
knowledge and technology to potential 
  
21
local suppliers. The problems in the way 
of local supplies were twofold. Mul-
tinationals preferred to rely on tradi-
tional suppliers, many of which followed 
the ‘flagship’ by investing in Hungary. 
On the other side, the current structure 
of Hungarian-owned industry is unsuit-
able for the role. Hungarian firms are 
too small and weak, and lack the tech-
nical and financial backup to supply the 
batches multinationals require to meet 
global demand.  
The question of technology transfer 
from multinationals, as a type of spill-
over effect, has been discussed by many 
authors. The author believes that in the 
Table 11 
Selected cases of expansion and reduction of production by foreign affiliates in Hungary 
(2002–2003) 
 
Affiliate Industry Action Employment impact 
Alcoa-Köfém Aluminium Relocation to H, regional computer centre +150 
Artesyn Kft Electronics Relocation to H, power supplies for telecom +100 
Audi Hungária Automotive Capacity expansion, 8-cylinder engine +330 
Robert Bosch Kft. Electronics Relocation to H. car electronics +500 
Robert Bosch Elek. Kft. Electronics Relocation to H. car electronics +250 
Bosch Rexroth Kft Electronics New capacity in car electronics +400 
Elcoteq Magyaro. Electronics Capacity expansion +250 
Electronic Data Systems Electronics New capacity, regional service centre +110 
Electrolux Lehel Kft White goods Relocation to H, refrigerator production +400 
Flextronics Internat. Electronics Expansion of cap. mobile phone production +2100 
Flextronics Internat Electronics Relocation from H X-box production -1000 
Foxconn Hon Hai Electronics New capacity, computer and phone parts +1600 
GE Capital Financial services Relocation to H, Regional call centre +400 
GE Hungary  Electronics Capacity expansion light bulb production +100 
GE Hungary  Electronics GE Lighting’s regional headquarters +500 
IBM Storage Products Electronics Relocation from H hard disk drive production -3700 
Jabil Circuit Electronics Relocation to H +600 
Kenwood Electronics Electronics Consolidation of regional production bases -200 
Küpper Hungaria Metallurgy New capacity foundry and metal working +80 
Magyar Suzuki Automotive Capacity expansion  +150 
Ortech Europe Automotive Capacity for supplies to Suzuki and Opel Polska +? 
Philips Magyarország Electronics Reloc. to H Cathode ray tube TV production +330 
Philips Magyarország Electronics Reloc. from H Cathode ray tube monitor prod. -500 
Philips Magyarország Electronics Expansion of capacities +1170 
Salamander Hungary Footwear Closure of factory -560 
Samsung Elektrom Electronics Expansion of factory television production +? 
Samsung Elektrom Electronics Relocation to H cathode ray tube production +500 
Sara Lee Food Expansion filtered tea for exports +? 
SEWS Magyarország Automotive New capacity, car spare parts +300 
Sunarrow Hungary Electronics New capacity supplies Nokia +120 
TDK Elektronika Electronics Relocation from H to Ukraine -200 
Toyo Seats Automotive New capacity +150 
Visteon Hungary Automotive Product development centre +30 
Visteon Hungary Automotive Relocation from H manufacturing of starters +? 
Zenon Systems Water treatment New capacity R&D centre +32 
Source: UNCTAD 2003. 
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Hungarian context, the problems with 
establishing supplier linkages again apply. 
Hungarian firms are not suitable part-
ners for multinationals, and so direct 
transfers to other companies are not 
very frequent. Based on empirical sur-
veys, Artner (2003a) found that multina-
tionals treated technological knowledge as 
confidential and did not want to facili-
tate Hungarian partners’ capabilities. But 
Artner (2003b) also found that a num-
ber of multinationals in Hungary were 
cooperating with Hungarian universities 
and think tanks, to tap their capacities. 
Such linkages were also promoted by 
some government measures. Artner 
named 5-6 major cooperation cases in 
the electrical equipment industry, and 2 
in the automotive industry. She con-
cluded that the flow of knowledge in 
these was rather unequal, but there was 
also some knowledge transfer from com-
panies, typically in the form of invest-
ment in technical equipment for universi-
ties. Based on her studies of linkages 
and technology cooperation, she criticized 
multinationals for their lack of interest in 
knowledge transfer. This judgement has 
also been made by some other authors, 
such as Günther (2002). 
Seen from the point of view of reloca-
tions, the sluggish development of sup-
plier networks and small scale of R and 
D activity suggests that many investors 
still treat locations in CEE countries as 
transitional sites, with changing factor 
endowments and prices. IBM Storage 
Products, for example, preferred to rent, 
rather than buy its production facilities. 
One would assume that this investment 
for assembling computer hard-disk drives 
was intended to stay only temporarily in 
Hungary. Chances of quick relocation 
were kept open and exit barriers mini-
mized. It is not possible here to estimate 
the prevalence of this approach, but 
there is evidence that it exists. It is 
preferable here to emphasize that many 
firms relocating activities from Hungary 
have replaced them by new, usually 
more demanding functions. Hungary, as 
a transitional site, serves as an important 
hub in the global task-distributing system 
of corporate networks, as host and do-
nor simultaneously. 
 
* * * * * 
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